September 4, 1986
HERBERT DANIEL DETTMER, APPELLEE, v. ROBERT LANDON,
DIRECTOR OF CORRECTIONS, APPELLANT
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Richard L. Williams, District
Judge. (CA-84-1090-AM).
Mark R. Davis, Assistant Attorney General (Mary Sue
Terry, Attorney General; Nelson, H. C. Fisher, Assistant Attorney General; John K.
Messersmith, IV, Third-Year Law Student on brief) for Appellant.
Jeffrey
S. Koeze, Third-Year Law Student, Post-Conviction Assistance Project, University
of Virginia School of Law (Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg, Supervising Attorney,
University of Virginia School of Law on brief) for Appellee.
The opinion of
the court was delivered by: Butzner
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge:
The
Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections appeals from an order of the district
court declaring the Church of Wicca to be a religion and enjoining prison officials
from denying Herbert Dettmer, an inmate at Powhatan Correctional Center, access to
six objects that he requested for use in the private meditation taught by the Church.
We agree with the district court that the doctrine taught by the Church of Wicca
is a religion, but we vacate the injunction because it is based on an erroneous legal
premise and lacks evidentiary support.
In 1982 Herbert Dettmer began studying
witchcraft in a correspondence course provided by the Church of Wicca. Within a year
he started meditating, following ceremonies for private meditation described in the
correspondence course and in other writings that he had gathered. Dettmer decided
that he needed the following items to aid and protect him while meditating: a white
robe with a hood, sea salt or sulfur to draw a protective circle on the floor around
him, candles and incense to focus his thoughts, a kitchen timer to awaken him from
short trances, and a small, hollow statue of "one of the gods or goddesses of
the deity," to store spiritual power called down during meditation.
The
Virginia Department of Corrections guideline 141, regulating inmates' personal property,
requires that inmates wishing to purchase merchandise through the mail must place
the order through the correctional officer in charge of inmates' property. This officer
orders the item, if it is authorized by guideline 141. If not, the officer sends
the request to the assistant warden for approval or disapproval. Late in 1983 Dettmer
requested permission to order the items he needed for meditating. The property officer
informed Dettmer that he would not be permitted to order them because guideline 141
did not list them as "authorized personal property."
Dettmer appealed
this decision to the warden, explaining that he needed the items for religious services.
The acting warden responded by letter of December 16, 1983: "The items you have
requested are not authorized under Division Guideline 141; therefore, your request
is denied. The items you have requested are considered contraband regardless of the
religious practices." Guideline 141 defines "contraband" as "generally,
any unauthorized item."
In an "informal resolution attempt"
beginning January 5, 1984, Dettmer offered to accommodate prison officials' concern
for security. He stated that salt would be an acceptable substitute for sulfur. He
also asserted: "I have stated that I would provide a box with lock for these
items and if need be then security could keep them in their possession until I checked
them out in the evenings." Dettmer also stated that he would provide documents
to show that the items were "needed for my religious practice."
On
January 10, Dettmer was informed that "the items listed in this grievance are
not permissible in accordance with . . . [guideline 141]. The items are all considered
contraband." Dettmer then appealed to the regional prison administrator. On
March 1, 1984, the regional administrator responded that Dettmer would be allowed
to use the chapel upon prior arrangement with the chaplain, during normal operating
hours when the chapel was not being used by other inmates. The regional administrator
found that the items requested are deemed to be a threat to the safety and security
of any penal
institution, and are not allowable under DGL 141 (Personal Property).
However, if you can provide this office with written proof through doctrine, that
the full practice of this rite, with the items you request, is a required tenet of
your faith, reconsideration will be given to your request.
Dettmer appealed
this decision to the fourth level of the grievance procedure, stating that he had
not yet been informed why the items were considered a threat to security. On September
25, 1984, the deputy director for the department of corrections replied: "Your
grievance has been appropriately considered and answered. I see no reason to alter
the Regional Administrator's response." On October 29, 1984, Dettmer filed this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Virginia Department of Corrections
had deprived him of freedom of religion.
The district court held that the
Church of Wicca is a religion, and it entered the following injunction:
Accordingly,
defendant is hereby ENJOINED from denying plaintiff access to the following items,
with the conditions as set out below:
(1): Sulfur, sea salt or uniodized salt:
Because plaintiff has indicated that any one of these three items would be equally
acceptable, the prison may designate which item plaintiff may be allowed to use.
(2):
Quartz clock with alarm: Plaintiff has indicated that a quartz clock with an alarm
would be an acceptable substitute for the kitchen timer, since prison officials expressed
the concern that a timer could be used as a detonator.
(3): Candles.
(4):
Incense.
(5): A white robe without a hood.
(6): The prison may take
general custody of the above items, and simply make them available to the plaintiff
at reasonable times for plaintiff's worship services, which the prison may supervise.
The plaintiff has agreed to provide a secure box for the purpose of storing the items.
On
appeal, the government asserts that the Church of Wicca is not a religion entitled
to the protection of the first amendment. Even if the Church of Wicca is a religion,
the government contends, Dettmer's meditation ceremonies using the requested items
are not entitled to first amendment protection because the doctrine of the Church
of Wicca does not require use of these items. Finally, the government contends that
even if the items are necessary, prison officials reasonably forbade Dettmer to possess
them because they would endanger prison security.
In determining whether the
Church of Wicca is a religion protected by the free exercise clause of the first
amendment, the district court properly considered whether the Church occupies a place
in the lives of its members "parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief
in God" in religions more widely accepted in the United States. United States
v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166, 13 L. Ed. 2d 733, 85 S. Ct. 850 (1964). The district
court found that members of the Church of Wicca "adhere to a fairly complex
set of doctrines relating to the spiritual aspect of their lives." These doctrines
concern ultimate questions of human life, as do the doctrines of recognized religions.
See Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1982); International Society
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 440 (2d Cir. 1981); Malnak
v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
The district
court also found that the contents of many of these doctrines parallel those of more
conventional religions. The Church of Wicca, the court found, believes in another
world and has a "broad concern for improving the quality of life for others."
Dettmer testified to his belief in a "supreme being."
The district
court also noted that the Church's doctrines teach ceremonies parallel to those of
recognized religions. Members of the Church of Wicca worship both individually and
corporately. Members also follow spiritual leaders. Dettmer testified that he planned
to conduct ceremonies privately and hoped to have the aid of a spiritual leader from
the outside community in conducting ceremonies for other inmates. The record showed
that he had sought guidance from Wiccan leaders and for several years had been studying
the doctrines of the Church of Wicca as expressed by these leaders in books, pamphlets,
and a correspondence course of study. Another objective criterion showing the Church
of Wicca to be parallel to recognized religions is witchcraft's long history. Cf.
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 650 F.2d at 440. Dettmer's evidence
includes a handbook for chaplains published by the United States, which states that
witchcraft enjoyed a following in Northern Europe during the Middle Ages as an ancient
pagan faith, losing public expression when systematic persecution began in the fifteenth
century. It regained some popularity after repeal of English witchcraft laws, and
the handbook estimates that there are between 10,000 and 100,000 adherents in America.
The
government contends that the doctrine of the Church of Wicca is not a religion because
it is a "conglomeration" of "various aspects of the occult, such as
faith healing, self-hypnosis, tarot card reading, and spell casting, none of which
would be considered religious practices standing alone." The government argues
essentially that because it finds witchcraft to be illogical and internally inconsistent,
witchcraft cannot be a religion. The Supreme Court has held to the contrary that
"religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible
to others in order to merit First Amendment protection." Thomas v. Review Board,
450 U.S. 707, 714, 67 L. Ed. 2d 624, 101 S. Ct. 1425 (1981).
The government
argues that even if Dettmer's beliefs may be termed "religious," his rites
are not. The government characterizes Dettmer's practices as more akin to meditation
than to religion. It asserts that Wiccan meditation is "primarily designed to
assist the practitioner to master the concept of positive thinking and to find internal
contentment." Dettmer testified, however, that he meditated to "call down
power" from "the supreme being" and other deities. The parties stipulated
to Dettmer's sincerity. The district court properly concluded that Dettmer's meditation
ceremonies are religious. See Malnak, 592 F.2d at 198 n.2 and 199.
The government
also contends that Dettmer's rites are not protected by the first amendment because
he has not proved that the items he requested are required by the Church of Wicca.
Religious
observances need not be uniform to merit the protection of the first amendment. The
Supreme Court has recognized that differing beliefs and practices are not uncommon
among followers of a particular creed. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. at 715. "It
is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the
petitioner or [another practitioner] more correctly perceived the commands of their
common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation." 450 U.S.
at 716. See also Barrett v. Virginia, 689 F.2d 498, 501 n.5 (4th Cir. 1982).
Dettmer testified he believed the items are necessary, because meditating without
them would pose "a dangerous threat to my well-being because we are dealing
with the spirit world." The district court properly concluded that the prison's
denial of access to the items that Dettmer sought was subject to the requirements
of the first amendment. See Gallahan v. Hollyfield, 670 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1982).
We
agree with the district court that the Church of Wicca occupies a place in the lives
of its members parallel to that of more conventional religions. Consequently, its
doctrine must be considered a religion. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166; Malnak, 592
F.2d at 207-10 (Adams, J., concurring).
No prisoner at the Correctional Center
is allowed to possess the items Dettmer wants. The security chief explained his concerns
as follows:
A white hooded robe could conceal a prisoner's face, and its resemblance
to a Ku Klux Klan robe would likely provoke adverse reaction from other prisoners;
Candles can be used as timing devices and to make impressions of keys;
A
hollow statue can be used to conceal contraband; Sulphur can be used to make an explosive;
Incense
can be used to disguise the odor of marijuana; and
A kitchen timer can be
used as a detonation device.
The state also objects to Dettmer's suggestion
that the items be kept in a locked box in the property office when he is not using
them. The custodian of the property office testified that contraband owned by prisoners
is stored there until arrangements are made for its disposition, but no facilities
exist for checking it in and out daily to prisoners. The officer also testified that
candles used for chapel services are not furnished by the prisoners. The state opposes
providing individual surveillance of Dettmer while he possesses the disputed items
during his daily meditation because of the burden this would impose, especially if
other prisoners sought similar exceptions to prison routine.
Although the
state has steadfastly insisted that Dettmer's action should be dismissed on the ground
that the Church of Wicca is not a religion, it also has taken the position that Dettmer
may practice his beliefs as long as he does not interfere with prison security. Dettmer
has permission to use the chapel when other services are not being conducted. All
prisoners can have bathrobes or boxing robes, watches, and clocks. Dettmer is no
exception. He can wear a robe that has no hood and he can use a quartz watch or clock
instead of a kitchen timing device. There is apparently no objection to a statue
that is solid, so that contraband cannot be concealed in it, provided it is small
and light enough to preclude its use as a weapon. These accommodations are acceptable
to Dettmer. Also, Dettmer is willing to substitute salt for sulphur. Thus, the dispute
has been narrowed to the government's objection to Dettmer's possession of candles,
incense, and salt during his meditation, and to its refusal to allow him to store
these items in a locked box in the property office when he is not using them.
Putting
aside the prison official's concerns, the district court held:
To the extent
that any of the prison's asserted justifications are legitimate, they are not warranted
in this instance because less restrictive alternatives are available to the state.
Prison authorities may simply keep the controversial items in a safe location, and
make them available to the plaintiff at reasonable intervals as plaintiff may require
them, and under such supervision as the defendant believes is necessary to promote
prison security.
As this quotation illustrates, the legal predicate for the district court's injunction
is the court's perception that the prison authorities had a duty to impose the least
restrictive alternatives to satisfy the need for security. The least restrictive
means test is appropriate for most encounters between state regulations and first
amendment claims. See Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. at 718 ("The state may
justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive
means of achieving some compelling state interest.").
But the least
restrictive means test is not an appropriate measure of a prisoner's first amendment
rights. Prisoners retain the right to freedom of religion. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 545, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979). Moreover, a prisoner must be accorded
"a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity
afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts." Cruz
v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 31 L. Ed. 2d 263, 92 S. Ct. 1079 (1972). In Bell v. Wolfish
the Court reiterated: "When an institutional restriction infringes a specific
constitutional guarantee, such as the First Amendment, the practice must be evaluated
in the light of the central objective of prison administration, safeguarding institutional
security." 441 U.S. at 547. In evaluating the restrictions, courts must accord
"wide-ranging deference" to prison administrators' decisions concerning
the proper means to accommodate prisoners' rights to the needs of "internal
order and discipline," unless there is "substantial evidence in the record
to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations."
441 U.S. at 547-48.
Affording officials the deference that Bell v. Wolfish
commands, we conclude that the security officer's concern about inmates' unsupervised
possession of candles, salt, and incense is reasonable. See Childs v. Duckworth,
705 F.2d 915, 921 (7th Cir. 1983). There is no substantial evidence indicating that
prison officials exaggerate the difficulties in supervising individual inmates' use
of contraband articles in religious rites. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 547-48.
Although
clergy may use candles during religious services in the prison, no prisoners, not
even those participating in conventional religious services, are allowed to possess
them. The decision to prohibit Dettmer from possessing the items that he sought did
not discriminate against him because of his unconventional beliefs. See Cruz v. Beto,
405 U.S. at 322.
The restrictions imposed on Dettmer must be viewed in context
of the accommodations officials have made to allow him to observe his religious beliefs.
Considered in this manner, the restrictions do not infringe the rights secured to
him by the first and fourteenth amendments. We affirm the district court's judgement
that the doctrine proclaimed by the Church of Wicca is a religion entitling Dettmer
to the protection that the first amendment affords prisoners. The injunction, however,
is premised on a principle that does not apply to prisoners. Tested by the applicable
precepts of Bell v. Wolfish and Cruz v. Beto, the injunction is not warranted by
the evidence.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.
August 27, 1999